Al-Qa'ida's Broken Spell

I ended my column of yesterday by saying that “Syria could be a sort of ‘beginning of the end’ for Al-Qa’ida.”  I want to continue today from where we left off, and to expand a bit more as to why I think that Al-Qa’ida has entered into a course of losing, not only in Syria but in the global sense as well. 

First of all, we can suggest that the orientation toward “national and/or regional” jihad, rather than “global” jihad, which I took up in yesterday’s column, and which began during the time of Usama Bin Ladin and very much reached a peak during the time of Ayman al-Zawhahiri, brought just as many disadvantages as advantages to Al-Qa’ida, and indeed perhaps even more disadvantages.  To list some of these: 

1) When Al-Qa’ida is mentioned, one thinks first of the suicide attacks that have taken place all over the world, and particularly in Western cities against Western targets, and above all that of 11 September 2001.  But Al-Qa’ida has not been conducting, or has not been able to conduct, actions of this sort for quite some time now.  The Al-Qa’ida actions that have taken place instead in various regions of the Islamic world have not been drawing attention in the global sense.  In other words, Al-Qa’ida, despite being a network organized globally, is no longer, or is ceasing to be, a global threat for the West.  This is the first indication that the spell of Al-Qa’ida has begun to be broken. 

2) In the current day, Al-Qa’ida is showing a very strong presence in Africa (Mali, Somalia,…), in Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan,…), and in the Middle East (Iraq, Syria,…).  It draws a certain degree of support from local populations, but the real bearers of these national/regional jihads are volunteers who come from other lands and have become quite professionalized.  Differences frequently come about between the conceptions of Islam, jihad, politics, etc., in the heads of these people and those of local elements.  Since the Al-Qa’ida members generally make no concessions in their ideas and behavior, they can, after a certain period of time, encounter serious problems with the peoples of the various regions.

 

3) The goal in national/regional jihads is more to seize political power rather than, as in the old days, to get rid of foreign occupiers.  Consequently, Al-Qa’ida has to fight against other Muslims (whether or not these are supported by foreigners) in these places.  And this is very contrary to the image of Al-Qa’ida that emerged, for instance, on 11 September. 

4) Hostility toward Shiites is coming very much to the forefront in Al-Qa’ida’s ideology, which is growing more rigid with every passing day.  The fact is, however, that in the Sunni Islamic world, such harsh enmity toward Shiites is an extremely marginal situation.  Consequently, the massacres directed against Shiite and Alawite civilians, which we witnessed in Iraq, in particular, and which are in the latest period confronting us in Syria, are causing deep damage to Al-Qa’ida’s general image.  

5) Al-Qa’ida’s hostility to Shiites naturally means getting at odds with Iran; in the past, the Tehran regime’s neutral stance, and in some places even its stance of winking at Al-Qa’ida, had greatly facilitated Al-Qa’ida’s activities.  Consequently, we can say that in Iraq and Syria, in particular, Al-Qa’ida is essentially fighting, in addition to local Shiite and Alawite forces, against Iran. 

6) Al-Qa’ida, which has adopted national and regional jihads as its fundamental strategy, is able to enter into cooperation and even alliances with various local and foreign forces in every region.  And this means the end of Al-Qa’ida’s most fundamental advantage in the past, which was its care in not getting others involved in its affairs. 

7) In my column entitled “Those Who Seek to Use Al-Qa’ida Get Burned,” (http://www.rusencakir.com/El-Kaideyi-kullanmaya-kalkan-yaniyor/2071), I had written:  “We can summarize the history of Al-Qa’ida as using those who thought they were using it.  The situations of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan are plain to see.”  The fact that countries that are worried over Iran’s regional rise, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait, are giving direct or indirect support to Al-Qa’ida or elements close to it, particularly in Iraq and Syria, is proof that they have not drawn sufficient lessons from history.   But this support, in addition to bringing Al-Qa’ida a great deal, also takes a great deal away from it.  Expressed in other words, it is a question of a situation in which neither those who seek to use Al-Qa’ida nor Al-Qa’ida itself, which uses those who seek to use it, will win.

 

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