A number of flashpoints litter Lebanon. Reports
of armed groups backed by foreign intelligence services note that they seek a
climate that would drag Hezbollah into a sectarian war. Although Hezbollah is
keen on showing patience and restraint - at least politically - it is ready to
suppress them, if necessary, militarily.
The armed groups in Tripoli, Saida, and the
Tariq al-Jdideh district of Beirut all have similar methods and composition,
which could mean that they are controlled by a single entity. In the aftermath
of the Saida battles between the Lebanese Army and Ahmad al-Assir's militants,
certain conclusions can be drawn from these groups' capabilities to withstand a
sweeping military operation.
Saida and Salafi Cleric Ahmad al-Assir
The bottom line is that eradicating the
militants from Tripoli would not be impossible if they were to cross any red
lines.Last week, Salafi cleric Ahmad al-Assir tested his military capabilities
on the ground. Around 120 of Assir's gunmen deployed throughout the city. There
were also reports that al-Jamaa al-Islamiya took part in the ensuing clashes,
but Assir failed to attract the support of groups in the Ain al-Hilweh
Palestinian refugee camp.
For two hours, Assir's fighters fired in the
air and at supposed Hezbollah buildings. But after some time, Assir's groups
received warning shots from heavy machine guns and two B-10 shells, throwing
Assir's militants - and him personally - into disarray.
This did not stop Assir's men from crossing a
red line by attacking a Lebanese Army checkpoint on Sunday, June 23, killing a
number of soldiers and prompting a decisive reaction from the military, which
has continued into today.
Tripoli
In the north Lebanese city of Tripoli, for
example, there are two red lines that the militants will not be allowed to
cross: entering Jabal Mohsen, which is likely to lead to a Syrian army
intervention; and threatening the strongholds of Suleiman Franjieh.
The facts on the ground indicate that the main
function of Tripoli militants is nothing more than to stir up trouble. For
instance, the fighters led by Salafi cleric Hussam al-Sabbagh in Bab
al-Tabbaneh do not number more than 400. Other groups include Jund Allah, a
110-strong group led by Sheikh Kanaan Naji, and Saad al-Masri's group of 40
militants.
In all the battles between Jabal Mohsen and its
surroundings, the militants have only tried once to storm a building at the
entrance of Jabal Mohsen. However, the Arab Democratic Party quickly responded
with dozens of shells of intermediate caliber, forcing the attackers to
retreat.
Meanwhile, whether in Tripoli or other
flashpoints, Syrian refugees are a factor in the calculations. Indeed, a
segment of the refugee population has become the equivalent of reserve forces
for the armed groups.
The bottom line is that eradicating the
militants from Tripoli would not be impossible if they were to cross any red
lines. Envisaging such a scenario necessitates learning the lessons of the
battle of Qusayr, where Hezbollah, for the first time in its history, carried
out a major offensive.
Qusayr's military implications are clear. They
demonstrate that Hezbollah has accrued extensive abilities in coordinating the
operations of various military formations, such as ground support and
artillery; command over the movement of forces in an area nearly half the
size as northern Lebanon; and can utilize its military intelligence to change
the circumstances of battle.
Tariq al-Jdideh
Militants in the Tariq al-Jdideh neighborhood
of Beirut are trying to establish a demarcation line with the Shia
neighborhoods, particularly the area of Shiyah.
The number of militants in Tariq al-Jdideh
barely numbers a thousand. They include Salafi fighters of Palestinian and
Syrian nationalities, as well as other local fighters. The nearby Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila also funnel fighters to the area, as is the case with the 40-member group led by Abu Khamis al-Beiruti.
Qusayr's military implications are clear. They
demonstrate that Hezbollah has accrued extensive abilities in coordinating the
operations of various military formations.These militants do not have adequate
combat training. This assessment was put to the test when Tariq al-Jdideh's
fighters attacked the Arab Movement Party headquarters nearly a year ago. Back
then, the party's offices fell as a result of deception alone.
In truth, it would have been possible to rescue
the headquarters if a coordinated force from outside the area had intervened,
while the cost of eradicating the Tariq al-Jdideh flashpoint would not have
exceeded, at worst, 20 casualties.
Nehme-Coastal Road
The militant groups stationed in Nehme along
the coastal road to Khaldeh do not number more than 200 fighters. These
militants' purpose is to block the coastal road between Beirut and Saida in
times of unrest. Another possible role is to break into the tunnels of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) holed
up in the hills in Nehme.
In fact, nearly a week ago, a fire was
deliberately started near the entrance of the tunnels, causing planted mines to
explode.
Conclusions
A military reading of the above-mentioned
flashpoints suggests the following conclusions:
- The common feature among all the militants is
the lack of organization and the absence of professional training.
- The intelligence services backing the
militants have only invested in Syrian refugees in a limited fashion. As soon
as many of these refugees arrive in Lebanon, they are given money to purchase
mobile phones and laptops. At best, this would only allow them to communicate
with the opposition coordination committees on social media platforms, and is
of no use in building up any significant militant grouping.
- In any simulation of a hypothetical war,
should red lines be crossed in Tripoli or Saida, learning from the Qusayr
experience will be vital.
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